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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

\VILBUR :JLA_WHINNEY and RUTH
E. :JI.A_WHINNEY,
PlaZ:utiffs and Appellants,
Case No.
7537

-YS.-

JOHN A. JENSEN and ANN A
JENSEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Respondents' Brief
STATE~1ENT

OF FACTS

The appeal in this action is based upon an order
of the District Court sustaining respondents' Demurrer
to appellants' Amended Complaint on the grounds that
no cause of action had been alleged. Appellants were
denied leave to amend. The matter was orally argued
before the District Court and written briefs were ordered
and submitted. The Court had previously sustained reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

spondents' Demurrer to the original Complaint also
upon the grounds that no cause of a~tion had been stated.
The facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint are
reproduced in appellants' brief, pages one to eighteen,
and are correct, except insofar as an inventory attached
to the principal contract involved is not set forth. However, the inventory is incorporated into the Amended
Complaint and is part of the transcript on appeal, it
being attached to the original Complaint.
Both the order of the District Court in sustaining
respondents' Demurrer to the original Complaint and
the order sustaining the Demurrer to the Amended Complaint were made pursuant to the Utah statutory rules
of procedure as they existed prior to January 1, 1950.
In those portions of this brief wherein reference is
made to appellants' Amended Complaint or where it is
summarized, every effort has been made to set forth its
provisions or substance fairly and objectively.

POINTS RELIED UPON FOR AFFIRMANCE
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUSTAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE
FIRST' COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
IN APP·ELLANTS' AMENDED COMPLAINT ON
THE· GR.O·UNDS THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION HAD
NOT BEEN ALLEGED, AND FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
1.

A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REFORMING
A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT HAS NOT BEEN ALLEGED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN IT APa.

2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PEARS FR{1~[ THE C0~1PLAINT THAT THE PARTIES THERETO DID NOT PREVIOUSLY ARRIVE
AT .A. FIN.A.Tj EXPRESSION OF THEIR INTENTIOX, .A.ND ''THERE THE EFFECT OF REFORMATIOX IS TO CRE.A.TE .A. CONTRACT UNINTENDED
BY THE P .A.RTIES.
b.

J.. S _A_ :JL.A.TTER OF LAW, THE JURISDIC-

TIOX OF EQlTITY WILL NOT BE INVOKED TO
_.:\_ WRITTEN INSTRUMENT WHEN IT
APPEARS FRO~I THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
CO~IPLAINT TH.A.T THE CO~IPLAINANT HAS,
BOTH SLEPT ON HIS RIGHTS AND HAS BEEN
SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAMAGE, IF
A.XY, RESULTING TO HIMSELF.
REFOR~I

c. A CAUSE OF 1-\.CTION FOR REFORMING A
WRITTEN IXSTR-Ul\1ENT HAS NOT BEEN AI..~
LEGED, AS _A_ ni.A_TTER OF LAvV, IF IT APPEARS
FRO~I THE COniPLAINT THAT THE INSTRUMENT, WHEN REDUCED TO WRITING, WAS
SUCH AS THE PARTIES THEJ\IISELVES DERIGXED IT TO BE.

d. A CAUSE 0~-, .A.CTION FOR REFORMING
A vVRITTEN INSTRUMENT HAS NOT BEEN
STA.TED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN THE
ALLEGED RIGHT TO REFORMATION IS BASED
UPON ORAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE INSTRU1fENT ITSFJLF DEJ\IONSTRATES THAT NO
SUCH REPRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE.
2. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUSTAINED RESPONDFJNTS' DEMURRER TO THE
SECOND COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR THE
REASON TI-IAT THIS COUNT FAILED TO STATE
A CAUSE OF ACTION.
3. THE DISTRICT COURT P~OPERLY SUSTAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMUR,RER TO THE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THIRD COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR THE
REASON THAT THIS COUNT FAILED TO STATE
A CAUSE OF ACTION.
4. TIUJ DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUSTAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE AMENDED
.COMPLAINT FOR THE REASON THAT NO CAUSE
OF ACTION HAD BEEN ALLEGED.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1-a
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUSTAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE FIRST
COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
THE REASON THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
REFORJYIING A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT HAD
NOT. BEEN A.LLEGED, AS A MATTER OF LAW\
WHEN IT APPEARS FROM THE COMPLAINT
THAT THE PARTIES THERETO HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY ARRIVED AT A FINAL EXPRESSION
OF THEIR INTENTION, AND WHERE THE EFFECT OF REFORMATION IS TO CREATE A CONTRACT UNINENDED BY THE PARTIES.
The jurisdiction of Equity is extended to reform
the terms of a written instrument only when that instrument fails, because of either fraud or mutual mistake,
to reflect an earlier but final agreement reached between
the parties. 53 C. J. 907 et seq. Reformation requires a
previous final agreement to which the instrument may
be made to conform as altered. A written document,
therefore, cannot be reformed if it appears that the
earlier agreement was not designed by the parties to
4
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represent the final expression of their intention ( 45 Am.
Jur. 586), and a Complaint "rhich demonstrates this to
be the ease has failed to allege a cause of action. It is
not sufficient to merely allege fraud.
This proposition is not disputed by appellants, and
on page 20 of their brief, the following appears:
"ln..c;truments are rescinded rather tha.n refornled 'vhere there has been no prior intention
to be implemented by the writing in question,
though the other elements of a. reformation are
present.''

It is perhaps significant that although appellants
outline at some length the details of Adamson vs. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 264; Stuck vs. Delta Land
& Water Company, 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791; and Bennett vs. Bowen, 65 Utah 444, 238 Pac. 240 and cite them
as authority in support of their right to reformation, all
three cases either speak of or deal with rescission for a
failure to arrive at a final bargain or for mistake and
in none was the issue of reformation presented or eve"n
discussed.
It is alleged in the first count of the first cause of
action in the Amended Complaint that appellants-buyers
and respondents-sellers formulated an original agreement on September 14, 1946. (Para. 3) This contract
was denominated an Earnest l\ioney Receipt and Agreement and is incorporated into the Amended Complaint
by Paragraph 3. The parties thereto agreed in this first
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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contract to execute a second and final contract at a later
date, and it is alleged that on October 28, 1946 the second
contract, denominated a Uniform Real Estate Contract,
was adopted. (Para. 8) This contract is incorporated
into the Amended Complaint by Paragraph 8, and provides that the buyers were to receive a hotel, a restaur~
ant, and the personal property on the premises at that
date, as enumerated in an attached inventory. Respondents are alleged to have removed portions of the personalty from the hotel and restaurant between the dates
of the initial agreement and final contract (Para. 10),
and appellants now seek to reform the second contract
to provide that they are to receive that personal property
on the premises at the date of the original agreement.
It is their position, and it is so alleged in Paragraph
19, that the first contract (Earnest Money Receipt and
Agreement) represented the final expression of intention
between the parties. Therefore, if it appears from the
Amended Complaint and its incorporated docum~nts
that such was not the case, no right to reformation has
been alleged because of the rule acquiesced in by appellants that Equity will not reform a written instrument
unless the complaining party can point to an agreement
previously adopted.which was intended by the executing
parties to be the final and conclusive expression of their
intention.
It is the position of respondents that the initial
agreement was not a final one, that it was not so intended
by the parties, and expressly so provides.
6
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rrhe first ngTPPillPllt denominates itself a ''receipt''
and purports to be nothing· else. Appearing upon this
document is the signature of a real estate agent, together
'vith a statement that the real estate company is to be
paid a commission. These features initially suggest
that the agreement 'Yns clearly not intended by the parties to contain all the terms of the final bargain. More
important, ho,Yever, are the following factors which are
significant in connection "Tith the language of the first
agreement:
1. Taxes were to be adjusted pro rata to the date
of the second contract.·
2. Interest on the unpaid balance " aS to run from
the date of the second contract.
7

3. The agreement speaks of the "date of closing"
as the date of the second contract.
4. ''Rents, insurance, interest, water, and other
expenses of said propel'ty shall be pro rated as of the
c/ a1 '£. 0 ~
e J D'S / N f:{
days. after .exeg;uti~n.
5. Sellers were given the right to change their
minds and cancel the agreement any time within two
days after execution.
6. "Contract of Sale or Instrument of Conveyance
to be made on the approved form of the Salt Lake Real
Estate Board ... "
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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7. "It is understood and agreed that the terms
written in this receipt constitute the entire prelimi.nar'!!
contract between the Buyer and Seller ... ''
The foregoing language makes it perfectly clear that
the initial agreement "\Vas meant by the parties to be
superceded and cancelled by provisions of a final contract which they agreed to execute at a specified later
date. It is uniformly held that a prior agreement and
all intervening oral negotiations become merged into the
final instrument. Landes & Co. vs. Fallows, 81 Utah 432,
19 P. 2d 389. This position seems to be conclusively
indicated by the following clause in the original agree-,
ment:
"It is further agreed that the execution of
final transfer papers abrogate this Earnest Money
Receipt.''

The Amended Complaint contains no allegation indicating that appellants are entitled to avoid these numerous provisions of the initial ag!eement. Instead, appellants have adopted the anomolous position of urging
the first agreement between the parties to be their final
contract when that instrument expressly provides 1n
unequivocal terms that such was not the case.
It is submitted, then, that no right to reformation
has been alleged. Appellants agree that as a matter of
law reformation requires a prior and final understanding in accordance with which the contract may be made
to conform. They point to and allege the first agreement
to be the concluding effort of the parties, yet they have,

8
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despite repPated inYitations, aYoided answering, and in
· their brief make no attempt to ans\\,.er, "'hat respondents
consider to be a particularly rrucjal question: How can
the first agreement be said to be final 'vhen that instrument expressly proYides in clear, precise, and unconditional language that it 'Yns not so intended; that it was
to be ''abrogated,' by execution of final transfer papers.
In addition, it is perhaps important to examine
briefly the effect of granting the reformation urged by
appellants. The clause in the second contract sought to
be reformed (''Together \vith all improvements, fixtures,
equipment, signs, merchandise, and stock now on the
premises; see attached Itemized List'') is perfectly clear
and unambiguous. Further, this clause is the first of
only four wholly typewritten terms in the entire instrument; the balance of the contract is printed. It is the
first descriptiYe clause in the document.
The "attached Itemized List" referred to by the
clause is an inventory which lists a total of 185 different
types of personal property to be received by the buyers.
This inventory serves to explain the term, ''Improvements, fixtures, equipment, signs, merchandise, and
stock.'' That is, the specific enumeration in the inventory
defines and limits the general words of the contract
clause. Lehi City vs. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530,
341 (citing 19 C. J. 1255) ; 28 C. J. S. 1049 and cases cited.
A copy of the inventory is attached to the original Complaint and is part of the transcript on appeal. Appellants
do not allege that they did not receive any of the items
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contained in the attached list, but complain that they
did not receive a total of 79 different types of personal
property not enumerated in the inventory.
By asking for reformation, then, appellants seek not
only to reform the first descriptive clause of the final
contract, but also to avoid the language of the first agreement which expressly provides that the second contract
was designed and intended by the parties to be a final
one, and in addition to add 79 different items to a detailed and itemized inventory. Finally, they ignore that
term in the final instrument which in effect provides
that the agreement as reduced to writing represents the
entire bargain between the parties. In other words, appellants seek to pick and choose among the terms of the
two agreements and to supplement their choice by parol
evidence with the net result that a completely different
contract is created and the purchase price as to them is
reduced by one-third.
Therefore, it seems that appellants are asking the
court to ignore the entire course of dealing between the
parties as reduced to writing in two separate instruments, and to construct for them a new and differe:r;tt contract which the Amended Complaint and its incorporated
documents show was unintended by the parties and one
which would be entirely foreign to the objectives of the
bargain.

10
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POINT 1-b
THE DISTRICT COlTRT PROPERLY SUSTAINED RESPOXDEXTS' DE?\IURR.ER TO THE FIRST
CO:UNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
THE RE . \SO~ THAT AS A niATTER OF LAW, THE
JURISDICTION OF EQUIT1T WILL NOT BE INVOKED TO REFQR,:JI _A_ WRITTEN INSTRUMENT
vVHEN I~r . .-\_!-)PEARS FR02\I THE ALLEGATIONS
IX THE CO~IPLAINT THA'l·· THE COMPLAINING
P.A_RTY HAS SLEPT ON HIS RIGHTS AND HAS
BEEN SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAMAGE, IF ANY, RESULTING TO HI1\1SELF.
In George YS. Fritsch Loan & Trust Company, 69
Utah 460, 256 Pac. 400, defendant in his counter-claim
prayed judgment for the reformation of a written contract 'vhich the plaintiff was seeking to specifically enforce against him. A period of 26 months had elapsed
from the execution of the contract until the time when
the defendant sought relief through reformation. This
court indicated at page 467 that:
''. . . the law is vvell settled in this and other
jurisdictions that a written contract will be reformed to express the agreement of the parties
v;,"'here the proof of the mistake is clear, definite,
and convincing, and ~vhere the party seeking reformation is not guilty of negligence in the execution of the contract nor of laches in making timely
application for its reformation.''
The reason for this position is outlined at page 471:
''The general rule is that relief by way of
reformation of a written instrument should not
be granted where the party seeking it has
acquiesced in the vvritten agreement after being
a"· are of the mistake.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-At page 472 the court, in speaking of defendant's right
to reformation, said: ''And there were laches in not
seeking timely relief . . . ''
It is alleged in Paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint that appellants were to take possession of the
premises on November 1, 1946. Paragraph 8 indicates
that the final contract was executed on October 28, 1946,
and Paragraph 17 states that upon entering into possession, appellant~ discovered an alleged deficiency in personal property. The transcript on appeal reveals that
this action was initiated on ,June 23, 1949, a period of 32
months after appellants are alleged to have discovered
the mistake. This term of 32 montns' delay might well
be contrasted with the period of 26 months involved in
George vs. Fritsch Loan & Trust Company, supra,
wherein it was held that the delay was unreasonably long.
Because laches is· apparent from the face of the
Amended Complaint and the transcript, it is proper to
raise the issue by way of Demurrer on general grounds.
Garrity vs. lVIiller, 204 Cal. 454, 268 Pac. 622; Kleinclaus
vs. Dutard, 147 Cal. 245, 81 Pac. 516; Ewald vs. Kierulff,
175 Cal. 363, 165 Pac. 942.
The Amended Complaint is fatally defective because
it demonstrates that appellants have slept on their rights,
if any they had, and there is no allegation whatsoever
explaining or seeking to excuse them from their laches.
The jurisdiction of Equity should not now be available
because of the delay, and respondents should not be
forced to prove the validity of a. contract under which the
12
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parties haYe been operating· "Tithout dispute for a period
of years.
The purpose of the rule announced in George vs.
Fritsch Loan & Trust Company, supra, is the burden it
places upon a contracting party "Tho is oblig·ed to search
for and come for"Tard \Yith proof of the validity of ~
written instrument after having placed his continued
reliance upon the contract and having had no reason to
belieYe that its terms 'vould be questioned in the future.
The rule is not designed to punish but to prevent intolerable hardship, since after the lapse of a long period of
time, it is easy to attack a "\Yritten document, but difficult
to defend one. Any other rule would place a contracting
party in the en-viable position of being able to determine
before commencing an action whether or not the lapse of
time has not made the other party unable to defend himself. It is to be normally expected that one experiencing
an alleged loss of over $10,000.00 will come forward
before a period of almost three years has elapsed. Appellants are here asking the help of Equity in relieving them
from their own written contract and yet have demonstrated by their Amended Complaint that they are not
entitled to assistance because of their delay.
This court has consistently held that delay will bar
Equity in suit for rescission based upon fraud. Skola
vs. ~1erril, 91 Utah 253, 64 P. 2d 185, 192 ; Taylor vs.
Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P. 2d 222, 226 (''To justify rescission, the party seeking to a vail himself of that remedy
must move promptly and with all reasonable diligence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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... upon discovery of the fraud.'' Citing Utah cases.)
This principle has equal npplication to suits for reformation. A contracting party cannot accept the benefits of
the bargain indefinitely and then choose to completely
revise the essential elements of the contract.
Moreover, the Amended Complaint shows that the
damage of which appellants complain was occasioned, if
at all, as the result of their own neglect. Virtually the
entire brief of appellants' is directed toward this matter.
However, little more than a brief review of the Utah
eases will be herein set forth.
In Rushton vs. Hallett, 8 Utah 277, 30 Pac. 1014,
plaintiff agreed to sell and defendant to buy real property consisting of two tracts and a deed was prepared.
Subsequently, defendant prepared a second deed wherein
he was to be conveyed three tracts of land, and ''Falsely
and fraudulently represented to plaintiff that the second
deed was the same as the first mentioned deed." (At 281)
Plaintiff, ''relying upon said false and fraudulent representations," (at 281) signed the deed and later brought
a suit to reform the second deed to conform with the
first. Defendant demurrered on the ground that no cause
of action had been alleged, and the District Court so held.
On appeal to this court, plaintiff argued that, "Equity
will reform a deed to make it conform to the intention
of the parties." (At 278) The Supreme Court affirmed
the order sustaining the demurrer holding that in an
action to reform a written instrument the neglect of the
complaining party may disqualify him, and the case is

14
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cited to that effert in 45 A.L.R. 701, 28 L.R.A. (NS) 799,
and 13 Cyr. 680. This court said at page 283 :
'' ... if the plaintiffs \vere imposed upon, it was
their O\\Tn neglect. The complaint does not charge
a mutual mistake, it charges fraud. If the plaintiffs \Yere defrauded, it \Yas their own fault entirely. Therefore, I think that there is no equity
stated in the complaint that calls for the interference of a court of chancery and, therefore, the
demurrer \Yas properly sustained.''
The concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe in Garner
vs. Thomas, 94 Utah 295, 78 P. 2d 529 indicates that the
pleader must sho\Y himself free from neglect. That opinion refers to Baker Ys. Patton, 144 Ga. 542, 87 S. E. 659
in which case reformation was sought for fraud and it
was held that a Demurrer should have been sustained
because of the neglect of the complaining party. The
Georgia court stated at page 660 :
"It is unneeessary to point out that petitioner
does not rely upon a mutual mistake of fact to
have the reformation of the writing ... He relies
upon fraud of the other party ... In fact, the
petitioner shows the grossest negligence on his
part. . . . lTnder these circumstances, we do not
think that petitioner is entitled to ... (reformation). And it was therefore error for the court
to overrule the demurrer thereto.''
The opinion of Justice Wolfe further provides:
''Reams vs. ~!cMinnville, 153 Tenn. 408, 284
S. W. 382, 384 lays do,vn the sensible rule that,
'The pleader must explain how the mistake was
made, and show that he was without fault in the
matter'."
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Appellants themselves make reference in their brief
to George vs. Fritsch Loan & Trust Company, 69 Utah
460, 256 Pac. 400 which ease denied reformation based on
mutual mistake because of neglect. The principles
adopted in the above cases seem to be correct, since one
seeking reformation of a written instrument is asking
for an extraordinary remedy. His pleadings must sho~
that he is entitled to the intervening of Equity.
It is submitted that the Amended Complaint is fatally defective because, (1) it contains no allegation indicating that appellants were free from neglect or explaining how the mistake was made, and (2) it conclusively
shows that the injury of which they complain was produced as a result of their own carelessness.
The inequitable conduct complained of consists of
a refusal on two occasions to permit appellants an opportunity to examine the premises (Para. 6); statements by
respondents as to the quantity of personal property and
an accompanying refusal to permit an inventory on the
day the final contract was executed. (Paras. 8 and 9)
·Superimposed upon this is the alleged state of fact that
appellants were unfamiliar with the restaurant and hotel
business (Para. 2); that they were strangers in the community (Para. 16) ; that they executed the final contract
on the premises i.mmediately after being denied a right
to examine the property (Paras. 8 and 9) for the purchase of which they obligated themselves to pay the sum
of $35,000.00; and that they were imposed upon in general.
16
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Thus, appellants are alleged to have voluntarily
executed a contract under g·rossly suspirious circumstances and 'Yithout haYing examined the premises they
"~ere buying; a contrart "\Yhich "\Yas perfectly clear and
unambiguous in eYery particular, and one executed after
appellants had thoroughly informed themselves of its
precise terms. In the "~ritten briefs submitted to the District Court, the follov..,.ing significant passage appears in
appellants' brief at page 12:
~'In

the case at bar, the plaintiff not only read
the document he signed, but before he signed it,
he deliberately and carefully attempted to ascertain "\Yhether that contract (the Real Estate Contract) stated his bargain and conformed to the
intentions of both parties.''
The fact that appellants are alleged to have been
newcomers to the community and unfamiliar with the
hotel business would not seem to place them in a better
position. If anything, it obligates them to display ordi- .
nary business prudence.
It is not surprising that appellants admit in their
brief to this Court on page 24:
''It should be noted that in this case we have
on one side a mistake which might easily have
been said to be due to the parties' negligence ... ''
To merely allege fraud will not entitle one to the
assistance of Equity in reforming a written instrument.
Rushton vs. Hallett, supra.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

•

It would appear, therefore, that the District Court
properly sustained respondents' demurrer since the
jurisdiction of Equity is not now available to assist the
appellants for the reason that they failed to institute a
timely action and because the damage of which they complain was occasioned, if at all, by their own neglect.
In their brief, appellants have outlined in detail
Stuck vs. Delta ·Land & Water Company, 63 Utah 495,
227 Pac. 791; Bennett vs. Bowen, 65 Utah 444, 238 Pac.
240; Beaver Drug Company vs. Hatch, 61 Utah 597, 217
Pac. 695; Adamson vs. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 Pac.
2nd '264; and Daly vs. Old, 35 Utah 79, 99 Pac. 460 in
regard to the matter of the neglect of the complaining
party. However, in all of these cases the action was
either based upon the theory of rescission or damages
and in none was the issue of reformation of a written
instrument presented. It does not, therefore, seem worthwhile to examine them in search of precedent.
POINT 1-c
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUSTAINED RESPONDENTS' DEJYIURRER TO THE FIRST
COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
THE REASON THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
REFORMING A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT HAS
NOT BEEN ALLEGED, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
IF IT APPEARS THAT THE INSTRUMENT, WHEN
REDUCED TO WRITING, WAS SUCH AS THE
PARTIES THEMSELVES DESIGNED IT TO BE.
Paragraphs 11, 13, and 15 of the Amended Complaint reveal that appellants were aware of the terms

18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the final contract; that they intended it to read as it
was then worded; and that it represented the voluntary
expression of their bargain. .Appell01nts knew that the
second contract 1cas not the same as the first, (Paragraphs 8, 11, and 15) and the disputed clause, the personal property "no"r on the premises," was deliberately
and understandingly included in the instrument. We
have, therefore, a case in which appellants are seeking
to avoid the very language in which they voluntarily
chose to express themselves.
This count fails to state a cause of action for the
reason that Equity will not reform a· written instrument
when the terms contained therein are such as the parties
designed them to be. The rule is stated in 5 Williston on
Contracts 4343 (Rev. Ed., 1937) :
"The province of reformation is to make a
\Yriting express the bargain which the parties desired to put in writing. Agreements of which they
did not desire written expression will not be put
into writing by decree of the court."
This position is outlined to like effect in 65 Am. St.
Rep.485:
''While a court of chancery will, upon proof
of fraud, accident, or surprise raise an equity by
which an agreement will be rectified according to
the intention of the parties, it will not interfere,
~vhere the instrument is such as the parties themselves designed it to be. If they voluntarily chose
to exp·ress thernselves in the language of a written
contract, they must be bou.nd by it, for there is no
general rule better settled or more just in itself,
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than that parties who enter into contract, and
especially contracts in writing, must be governed
by them as made . . . ''
In 53 C. J. 908 the principle is stated in the following terms:
"However, the instrument can only be reformed to conform to the parties' agreement, that
is, it may only be reformed to express some material thing whi~h the parties agreed upon and
meant to put in, but left out, or by striking out or
changing something they did not mean to express.
A contract which the parties intended to make,
but did not make, cantnot be set up in place of one
which they did make, but did not intend to
mak e ... ''
The Amended Complaint in no way suggests that
the expression, the stock ''now on the premises,'' did not
accurately describe the bargain. That is, the pleading
shows that appellants knew that all they were to receive
was the stock then on the premises. They complain, however, that respondents made oral representations concerning the quantity of personal property, (Paras. 9, 10
and 11) and that appellants ''wholly relied upon said
representations ... and would not have entered into the
... contract as it was then worded'' had they been aware
of an alleged deficiency. (Para. 15) The available authorities seem to agree that a. written instrument may not
be reformed on the basis of these allegations.
5 Willisto~ on Contracts 4343 (Rev. Ed., 1937) Indicates:
20
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"Similarly, if the parties to a written instrument understand that part of their previous
agreement has been omitted from the writing and
rely on oral agreement ''Tith one another to vary
or add in certain respects to the written agreement, w·hether they rely on moral obligation or
believe that such a variation or addition is legally
valid, equity cannot reform the writing by the
insertion of the oral agreement.''
23 R. C. L. 311 provides :
''The court in recognizing the equity (of reformation) cannot make such a contract as it
thinks the parties ought to have made or would
have made if better informed.... Neither will the
court insert a provision which was omitted with
the consent of the party asking for reformation,
although such consent was given in reliance on
oral promise of. the other party that the omissio~
should not make any difference.''
5 Williston on Contracts,
points out:

4~41

(Rev. Ed., 1937)

· "It is not enough to j~tstify reformation that
the court is satisfied that the parties would have
come to a certain agreement had they been aware
of the act-ual facts."
The Amended Complaint does not proceed upon the
theory that the instrument as written was designed
intended by the parties to read otherwise than as it did,
or that it did not accurately represent the bargain. Instead, it is complained that appellants were mistaken as
to how much stock was then present. It would seem,
therefore, that the pleading if anything would go to the

or
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existence of the contract because of mistake as to the
subject matter rather than to the reformation of it.
It is clear that the instrument as written was such
as the parties voluntarily intended it to be and it cannot,
for that reason, be altered. This is a necessary principle
in contract law, since to hold otherwise would oblige one
to enter a contract at the peril of the .other party's later
reforming the instrument on the basis that he did not
mean what he said, but meant something entirely different all along.

/

It is not sufficient in seeking to allege a right to
relief by way of reformation simply by outlining the
elements of fraud. A written instrument incorporating
those provisions which the contracting parties desire is
not made less valid merely by complaining that it was
the product of unfair conduct. It is, therefore, submitted
that no right to reformation has been alleged.
POINT 1-d
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUSTAINED RESPONDEN-TS' DEMURRER TO THE FIRST
COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
THE REASON THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
REFORMING A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT HAS
NOT BEEN STATED, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
WHEN THE ALLEGED RIGHT TO REFORMATION
IS BASED UPON ORAL REPRESENTATIONS AND
THE INSTRUMENT ITSELF DEMONSTRATES
THAT NO SUCH REPRESENTATIONS HAVE
BEEN MADE.
22
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Paragraphs 9 to 16 of the Amended Complaint in
substance allege that respondents made certain oral representations to appellants concerning the quantity of
personal property on the premises at the time of the
execution of the final contract. It is then alleged that
appellants 'vere induced to believe the truth of the statements; (Para. 11) that they signed the contract on the
faith of oral representations, (Para. 15) ; and that they
are, therefore, entitled to reformation of the contract
because, other than for the alleged representations, they
would not have executed the instrument. (Paras. 11 and
15.) The following clause is contained in the final contract relating to this issue:
''It is hereby expressly understood and agreed
by the parties hereto that ... there are no representat-ions, covenants, or agreements between the
parties hereto with rreference to said property,
except as herein specifically set forth or attached
hereto.''
The Amended Complaint contains no allegation to
the effect that appellants are entitled to avoid this
language and are not bound by it. It is, therefore, submitted that the instrument may not be reformed on the
basis of oral representations or on the basis of a prior
agreement when the instrument itself expressly provides
that no such representations nor agreements have been
made.
POINT 2
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUSTAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE
SECOND COUNT OF THE,FIRST CAUSE OF ACT'ION IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR THE
l~EASON THAT THIS COUNT FAILED TO STATE
A CA,USE OF ~\_CTION.
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The second count of the first cause of action is one
in tort wherein it is alleged that respondents made certain oral representations to appellants concerning the
quantity of personal property on the premises (Paras.
2 and 7), and that relying on those representations, appellants ''executed said Uniform Real Estate Contract
and were damaged ... " (Para. 11) This count fails to
state a cause of action for three reasons:
First, it is not alleged that appellants had a right
to rely upon respondents' representations. A cause of
action in Utah based upon actionable fraud must include
that element. Kinnear vs. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 Pac. 2d
1094, 1095; Stuck vs. Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah
490, 505, 227 Pac. 791. This principle is admitted by
appellants in their brief at pages 21 and 35.
In count two of the Amended Complaint it is alleged
that the representations were false, material, intentional,
relied upon, and that damage resulted. However, it is
not alleged in any portion of this count, either directly
or by inference, that appellants were entitled to rely
upon the alleged representations. This count, therefore,
fails to state a cause of action.
Secondly, the stated facts show that appellants cannot now claim to have been deceived or that they were
entitled to rely upon the alleged representations. Paragraph 1 of the second count (incorporating Paras. 4 and
5 of the first count) alleges that respondents stated to
appellants that all the personalty on the premises at the
date of the original agreement would be conveyed and
24
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that none \Yould be removed during respondents' interim
possession. It is then alleged (incorporating Para. 6)
that appellants 'vent to the premises for the purpose of
conducting an inventory, but were refused admission by
respondents, and that they returned and were again
denied access. Further, on one occasion (Para. 7 as incorporated) appellants commenced an inventory of their
own; that is, they chose not to rely upon respondents'
alleged representations. Paragraphs 2 of the second
count then indicates that respondents repeated the representations concerning the quantity of personal property,
but that appellants again demanded a right of inspection. This demand was refused and the parties then
executed the contract while on the premises. It is submitted that these facts demonstrate that appellants cannot now urge that they were deceived or that they relied
or had a right to rely upon the alleged representations.
''To maintain an action for fraudulent representations, it is not only necessary to establish the
telling of the untruth, knowing it to be such, o~
that it was told ""\\rithout knowledge of the facts,
but also to prove that the plaintiff had a right to
rely upon it, and did so rely ... '' (Citing cases)
Dyck vs. Snygg, 138 Neb. 121, 292 N.W. 119, 123.
The Amended Complaint clearly shows that the alleged representations were accompanied with circumstances so outrageously suspicious as to cast serious
doubt upon the truth of the statements. Of course, one
is not obliged to assume that he 'vill be abused by fraud.
However, he cannot, after his suspicion is aroused, complain that he is entitled to rely upon the representations
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made to him. "It is difficult to believe that the plaintiff is as credulous as he claims.'' Skola vs. Merrill, 91
Utah 253, 64 P. 2d 185, 192. ''One cannot close his eyes
to the obvious and then claim to be deceived." Del Rio
vs. Ulen Contracting Corp., 94 F. 2d ( CCA Tex.) 701,
703. This is particularly true in the light of the fact that
appellants admittedly questioned, if they did not thoroughly disbelieve, the statements imputed to respondents,
this being evidenced by repeated demands for an examination of the property for the avowed purpose of confirming the representations made concerning it. The
relevant cases seem to support the conclusions above
stated.
''Does the evidence show that the defendant
... had sufficient knowledge to require an investigation or inquiry on her part before becoming a
purchaser.... Where circumstances of a questionable nature, creating a suspicion of fraud, come
to the attention of one whose duty it is to investigate, and where, if inquiry were made, the facts
constituting the fraud would be disclosed, and
such person fails to make such inquiry, the law
charges him with full knowledge of whatever facts
pertaining to the fraud would have been disclosed." United States vs. Conklin, 54 Fed. Supp.
(D. C. Mont.) 500, 502.
"Restatements of the fraudulent representation do not themselves constitute concealment, and
where a party is once put upon notice of fraud he
cannot avoid the consequences of his constructive
knowledge of the fraud nor fulfill his duty to investigate by going to the party he suspects of the
fraud. He cannot desist from further investiga. tion because he is reassured of the truth of the
26
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original representations.'' (Citing cases) Feak
vs. l\Iarion Steam Shov. Co., 84 F. 2d ( C.C.A.
Ore.) 670, 673.
"The rule is universally recognized in fraud
cases that "'"here the buyer is aware of suspicious
circumstances or has learned of the falsity of one
or more of the representations, he . . . may not
rely upon the statements of the seller." Carpenter vs. Hamilton, 18 Cal. App. 2d 69, 62 P. 2d
1397, 1401.
"If (the party alleging fraud) becomes aware
of facts that tend to arouse his suspicion, or if he
has reason to believe that any representations
made to him are false or only half true ... he has
no right to rely on statements of the other contracting party. Cameron vs. Cameron, 88 Cal.
App. 2d 585, 199 P. 2d 443, 447.
Statements to the same effect are set forth in United
States vs. Krueger, 228 Fed. (C.C.A. Colo.) 97, 103 and
Dyck vs. Snygg, supra., at 123 (N.W.).
Appellants cannot improve their position merely by
asserting that they had no access and were therefore
forced to rely upon the alleged representations. The fact
that they were repeatedly and without valid reason denied a right of inspection only aggravates the suspicious
character of the events rather than placing appellants
in a better light.
Moreover, the fact that appellants are alleged to
have commenced an inventory (Para. 7 as incorporated)
withdraws from their right to rely. Wells vs. Lloyd, 125
P. 2d 128, 134 (Cal. 1942) (''In view of the act that Bay
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Cities commenced its investigation it cannot be said that
it placed reliance upon any representations.'') The
reason for this principle is that in a judicial contest, it
would be thorouglily impossible to determine how much
knowledge the investigation had revealed and it would
be impossible to discover how much the buyer relied
upon his own investigation and how much he relied upon
the alleged statements.
It is submitted that appellants cannot now, years
thereafter, be heard to say that they were deceived Q.r
that they were entitled to rely upon statements allegedly
made to them for the following reasons clearly revealed
upon the face of the pleading: (1) The representations
made were accompanied with grossly suspicious circumstances squarely directed at the veracity· of the statements; (2) Appellants admittedly questioned the truth
of the statement upon which they now seek to rely; that
is, appellants are alleged to have relied upon representations which they themselves· doubted to be true; and
(3) Appellants commenced an independent investigation
and must be conclusively presumed to have relied upon
the information obtained therefrom or, in the alternative, be charged with the knowledge it would have revealed if diligently pursued to completion.
Beaver Drug Co. vs. Hatch, 61 Utah 597, 217 Pac.
695, is the only case cited by appellants in support of
the second count (page 35 of appellants' brief), and it
is clearly distinguishable. In that case plaintiff was
entitled to rely and did rely upon rep res en ta tions made
28
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to him since he had no reason to question the truth of
the statements. Appellants here cannot successfully
assert that they did rely or 'vere entitled to rely upon
the Yery representations "Thich appeared to be untrue,
and which w·ere, in fact, seriously questioned. Further,
if appellants in the present action had completed the
investigation once begun, it would have revealed to them
the alleged inventory shortage of which they complain.
In the Beaver Drug case, this was not true· because the
representations dealt with the val~te ~f a stock of drugs
and in that action it would have required expert assistance to discover the falsity of the representations and,
in fact, an expert was retained for the precise purpose
of determining the worth of the drugs. In order to allege
a cause of action in deceit, it must be made to appear
that the damage complained of directly resulted from
reliance placed upon representations and that this relianee was justified. One cannot show himself entitled
to relief by complaining that his damage resulted from
statements which he had every reason to doubt and when,
in fact, he did entertain doubt. Yet this is precisely the
substance of the second count.
Third, the eontract itself demonstrates that no representations were made. Because the tort is alleged to
arise from a contract and because that contract is made
a part of the second count, it seems proper to examine
the language of the instrument for relevant terms.
"It is hereby expressly understood arnd agreed
by the parties hereto that ... there are no repre.sen.tations . . . between the parties hereto with
reference to said property.''
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It is perhaps significant to note that this clause does
not merely provide that the parties are precluded from
demonstrating representations if any have been made;
it provides that ''there are no representations.'' The
term is not, therefore, open to attack on the basis of its
being unfair or invalid as precluding proof of the factors
which induced a contract. Appellants now seek, in count
two, to depart completely from this language without first
alleging that they are entitled to avoid, reform, or strike
it from the contract. This court said in Strike vs. White,
91 Utah 170, 175, 63 Pac. 2d 600, that a written instrument
may be reformed under appropriate circumstances, "but
until that is done, the parties are bound by its terms.''
The clause, in addition, serves as another method
by which Beaver Drug Co. vs. Hatch, supra, may be
distinguished since, in that case, no contract term of this
type a ppea.red in the bargain between the parties.
For. the above reasons it is submitted that the second
count fails to state a cause of action.
POINT 3
THE DISTRIC~, COURT PROPERLY SUSTAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE
THIRD COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR THE
REASON THAT THIS COUNT FAILED TO STATE
A CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR THE REASON THAT THIS COUNT
FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
The third count of the first cause of action in appellants' Amended Complaint takes the form of a contract
30
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action for breach of 'Yarranty. Paragraph 2 alleges that
respondents ''represented and warranted'' concerning
the quantity of personal property on the premises, and
in their brief, appellants define the nature of the alleged
\Yarranty as " ... an affirmation of fact that is a representation, is a "'"arranty . . . " (Page 36) This count
fails to state a cause of action for three reasons:
First, because the alleged warranty is said to arise
from respondents' representations, it seems proper to
again refer to the terms of the principal contract:
"It is hereby expressly understood and agreed
that ... There are no representations, covenants,
or agreements between the parties hereto with
reference to said property . . . ''
This language expressly provides that there are no
representations and the third count appears defective
since it is not alleged that appellants are entitied to
avoid, reform or strike this clause from the contract.
It has been the position of appellants that this term
is ineffective and should be ignored. However, this overlooks the fact that a clause of this nature is given ~ffect
by the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 81-6-1 :
"Where any right, duty or liability would
arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement.''
Secondly, the Amended Complaint demonstrates an
acceptance by appellants of the delivered personal prop.;.
erty, the effect of \vhich is to relieve respondents from
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liability or an alleged breach of warranty. Sec. 81-3-8
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943 provides in part:
"The buyer is deemed to have accepted the
goods when . . . (they) have been delivered to
him, and he does any act in relation to them which
is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller,
or when after the lapse of a reasonable time, he
retains the goods without intimating to the seller
that he has rejected them."
Since the facts are undisputed for the purposes of
this Demurrer, the question of an acceptance is properly
one for the court. Foell Packing Co. vs. Harris, 127 Pa.,
Supra, 494, 193 Atl. 152. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the third
"
count allege that appellants took possession of the goods
on October 28, 1946 and the transcript on appeal indicates that this action was commenced on June 23, 1949,
a lapse of 32 months.
It is not alleged that the goods were rejected or
protest made, and the act of appellants in retaining
the personal property constitutes an acceptance. Pursuant to identical statutory provisions, it was held in
Knobel vs. I. Bartel Co., 176 Wis. 393, 187 N.W. 188,
that a buyer's failure to reject delivered goods after
having them in his possession for 25 days constituted
acceptance as a matter of law. The same result was
reached as a matter of law, in Milz vs. Bloomfield, 146
Misc. 649, 262 N. Y. S. 580 (three weeks); Matchless
Electric Co. vs. Morley, 252 Mich. 144, 233 N.W. 202 (two
months); Tegan vs. Chapin, 176 Wis. 410, 187 N.W. 185
(57 days); Goodlotte vs. Acme Sales Corp., 229 Ill. App.
32
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610 ( 6 months) ; and Kirsch vs. Coon, 111 Conn. 564, 150
.A.tl. 523 (one year). The Amended Complaint, therefore,
demonstrates that as a matter of la'v appellants made
an acceptance of the delivered goods.
The effect of an acceptance is stated in Section 813-9 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943:
''In the absence of express or implied agreement of the parties, acceptance of the goods by
the buyer shall not discharge the seller from liability in damages or other legal remedy for breach
of any promise or warranty in the contrae:t to sell
or the sale. But if after acceptance of the. goods,
the buyer fails to give notice to the seller of the
breach of a;ny promise or warranty within a
reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ough.t
to know of such breach, the seller shall not be
liable there fore.
This proYision of the Sales Act defines the rights·
of the parties in instances such as this where a breach
of "rarranty is alleged against a seller of personal property, (Rothenberg vs. Shapiro, 140 N.Y.S. +48) and
notice promptly forthcoming from the buyet is a vital
condition precedent to recovery. March Wood Products
Co. vs. Babcock Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (it is an
"absolute condition.") ; W. S. Maxwell Co. vs. Southern
Oregon Gas Co., 158 Or. 168, 74 P. 2d 594. The failure
to allege prompt notice is a matter which may properly
be raised by Demurrer (Holland vs. Good Brothers, 318
Mass. 300, 61 N.E. 2d 544), and the question as to
whether an unreasonable time has elapsed may be resolved by the court. Marmet Coal Co. vs. People's Coal
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Co., 226 Fed. ( C.C.A. Ohio) 646; American Rag Co. vs.
U.S. Hoffman Machine Co., 320 Ill. App. 556,'. 51 N.E. 2d
809.
Allegations of fraud do not dispense with the need
for notice, and even the fact that a seller of goods may J,e
allege:tto have had lrnowledge of his own does not alter
the operation of the statute. American Mfg. Co. vs. V. S.
Shipping Board Emergency Corp., 7 F. 2d (C.C.A.N.Y.)
565; Simoz vs. Brockman, 249 Wis. 50, 23 N.E. 464.
This section of the code requires notice ''of the
breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable
time after the seller knows, or ought to know, of such
breach.'' The Amended Complaint does not allege that
appellants gave notice of a warranty breach or protested
or rejected the goods. Instead, paragraph 3 of the third
count alleges that ''upon. entering into the possessio~
of the premises . . . ' ' in October, 1946 the alleged breach
of warranty was discovered. On June 23, 1949 a differ.
ence in time of 32 months, the original Complaint was\
filed, it being the first notice communicated to respondents.
As a matter of law, an unreasonable period of time
has elapsed and the cases constituting this section of
the Sales Act uniformly so hold. Silberman vs. Engel,
125 Misc. 816, 211 N.Y.S. 584 (39 days). Harburger vs.
Stern, 189 N.Y.S. 74 (7 months); Stewart vs. Menzel,
181 Minn. 347, 232 N.W. 522 (7 months); Tegan vs.
34
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Chapin, 176 ''Tisr. 410, 187 N.W. 185 (57 days); see lA
[ln,ifor-tn La,lcs --..lnn. (Sales) 107 et. seq.
The . .\mended Complaint on its face, therefore,
demonstrates (1) an acceptance of the personal property
delivered, and ( 2) a failure to protest within a reasonable time. The pleading is fatally defective as a matter
of law, pursuant to the Sales Act as adopted in Utah.
Although the cases cited above are from foreign
jurisdiction, it seems appropriate to refer to them,.
since it was held in Stewart vs. Hansen, 62 Utah 281,
218 Pac. 959, 44 A.L.R. 340 that in an effort to give the
Sales Act uniform application, it is proper to consider
the interpretations placed upon identical provisions by
courts in other states. In addition, Section 74 of the
Uniform Sales Act provides:
'' (The Sales Act) shall be so interpreted and
construed as to effectuate its general purpose and
make uniform the laws of those states which enact
l"t~

"

Third, even In the absence of these provisions of
the Utah Code, and of the disclaimer term in the contract, the third count still fails to state a cause of action.
Appellants arg11e in their brief at page 37 that, "The
written contract has left the quantity of stock uncertain
and resort must be had to the oral statement as to quan-.
tity to complete the agreement." The clause to which
appellants refer as uncertain provides:
''Together with all improvements, fixtures,
equipment, signs, .merchandise, and stock now on
the premises; see attached Itemized List.''
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It is respondents' position that this clause and the
attached inventory are perfectly clear and unambiguous
in every particular and that, as a result, it would be
improper as a matter of law to add, by parol evidence,
79 other types of personal property to the inventory.
Appellants contend that the expression ''stock and
merchandise'' is ambiguous because the attached inventory contains no items which, they argue, are normally
associated with those terms, and that these items may
properly be added. However, it seems correct to suggest that appellants may not impute a meaning to the
terms of the contract entirely different than that which
the contract gives them. That is, the inventory serves
to explain the contract clause since the specific enumeration defines the general terms in the clause. Lehi City
vs. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530, 541 (citing 19 C.J.
1255); 28 C.J.S. 1049 citing cases.
In Landes & Co. vs. Fallo"rs, 81 Utah 432, 19 P. 2d
389, 392, the court said :
''If, on the other hand, the contract of sale
specifically designates the subject-matter of the
transaction, such designation must control and
cannot be enlarged by construction. ' '
Further, it is significant that most of the damages
sought by appellants is for equipment such as a tool
chest, electric griddle, radiators, stoves, rifle, a utomobile, etc., which items could clearly not be denominated
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''merchandise and stock'' under the meaning imputed
to that expression by appellants.
For the above three reasons, it is believed that the
District Court properly sustained respondents' Demurrer to the third count.
POINT 4
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUSTAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE
SECOND CAUSE OF .ACTION IN THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR THE REASON THAT NO CAUSE
OF ACTION HAD BEEN ALLEGED.
Appellants' second cause of action IS alleged to
arise from the failure of a heating system on the
premises to conform to the standard of quality imputed
to it by respondents. In their brief appellants have not
argued against the order of the District Court in sustaining Demurrer to this cause of action and no argument will be made except to indicate that Paragraph 2
of that cause of action incorporates the final contract
into the Amended Complaint and a term of that instrument provides :
"It is hereb yexpressly understood and agreed
that the buyer accepts the said property in its
present condition ... ''
The Amended Complaint does not allege that appellants are entitled to avoid this language, and it would
therefore appear that no cause of action has been stated.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the District Court
properly sustained respondents' Demurrer and correctly
denied le.ave to amend for the reason that no portion of
the Amended Complaint alleges a cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,
L.C.MONTGOMERY
Heber, Utah
EDWARD L. MONTGOMERY
Detroit, Michigan
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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